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Edward Feser: Anti-reductionism in Nyāya-Vaiśesika atomism


Atomism
takes all materials objects to be composed of fundamental particles that aren’t
themselves breakable into additional elements. 
In Western philosophy, the concept goes again to the Pre-Socratics Leucippus
and Democritus, and was revived within the early trendy interval by thinkers like Pierre
Gassendi.  The final spirit of atomism survived
in colleges of thought that deserted the concept that there’s a stage of strictly
unbreakable particles, equivalent to Boyle and Locke’s corpuscularianism.  Its present-day successor is physicalism, however
right here too there have been additional modifications to the essential historic thought.  For instance, non-reductive manufacturers of
physicalism permit that there are info about at the least some on a regular basis objects that
can’t be captured in an outline of micro-level particles.

Atomism has
an extended and attention-grabbing historical past in Indian philosophy as effectively, and an
anti-reductionist model was developed inside the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika custom
(named for 2 techniques which arose independently however later blended
collectively).  Some key arguments have been
labored out in response to rival, reductionist manufacturers of atomism defended inside
sure colleges of Buddhism.  They are often
discovered within the Nyāya-sūtra and the
commentarial custom based mostly on it, related texts from which could be present in
the very helpful current assortment
The
Nyāya-sūtra: Picks with Early Commentaries
, edited by
Matthew Dasti and Stephen Phillips.

An vital
bigger theme within the Nyāya-sūtra
(which covers all kinds of metaphysical matters) is the self-defeating
character of skepticism.  The
commentators deploy this concept in opposition to Buddhist reductionist atomism as
effectively.  (Cf. pp. 100-3 of Dasti and
Phillips.)  Either side make reference to
odd objects, equivalent to a clay pot. 
Either side agree that the pot is finally made up of unobservable
atoms.  However the Buddhist reductionist
says that these atoms are actually all
that exist, that there isn’t any such factor as a composite complete over and above
them.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika
commentators argue that the place that outcomes from that is incoherent.  The Buddhist place presupposes that we are able to
know that there are atoms, however claims that the composites we take to be made up
of atoms are unreal.  If they’re unreal,
then after all we can’t be mentioned to know of them by way of notion.  However the atoms should not perceptible both.  So how might the Buddhist know of them any greater than he is aware of the purportedly
unreal composites?  In reality it is just
by way of the composites that we are able to know the atoms that make them up.  Therefore the composites should be actual.

This
argument focuses on our information of
objects, however a second, associated level made by the commentators focuses on our lively engagement with them.  Composite objects could be grasped and pulled,
and typically pulled merely by advantage of getting maintain of part of them.  This might not be completed if there have been no
composite over and above the entire. 
Contemplate how, in case you spill a pile of sugar on the counter, you possibly can’t
take away it merely by greedy one facet of the pile and thereby pulling the entire
pile.  The argument is that if the atoms
have been all that basically existed and the composite complete didn’t, you then couldn’t
pull on a pot (say) any greater than you may pull on a pile of sugar.

The
commentators contemplate doable objections the reductionist may increase.  (Cf. pp. 103-6 of Dasti and Phillips.)  Contemplate an object fabricated from bits of straw,
rocks, and wooden glued collectively. You possibly can pull on it simply by advantage of pulling
some a part of it, however the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika anti-reductionist wouldn’t wish to
contemplate this random object a real composite the way in which a pot is.  The commentator Uddyotakara responds by
biting the bullet and permitting that this odd object ought to be counted as a composite. 
(Right here we see how Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika anti-reductionism, although one thing with
which an Aristotelian hylemorphist is certain to sympathize, just isn’t fairly the
identical place.  For the Aristotelian, we
want to attract some vital distinctions right here. 
The random object in query would have a merely unintentional kind relatively
than a considerable kind, and thus not rely as a real substance, even whether it is
a composite of some variety.)

One other
doable objection to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika place that the commentators
contemplate goes like this.  For those who have a look at
a forest from far sufficient away, it might probably seem like a single, unified
complete.  However it is a misperception, and
in actual fact there may be nothing extra there than the timber that make up the
forest.  Equally, the place we take there
to be an on a regular basis composite just like the pot of our earlier instance, there may be
actually solely the atoms that make it up.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika
response to this objection is that the analogy is a false one, as a result of atoms,
not like the timber that make up a forest, should not observable.  Within the case of the forest, it is sensible to
say that we’re actually perceiving timber, and easily mistaking them for some
bigger complete.  We do, in any case, actually
see the timber.  However within the case of an
object like a pot, it doesn’t make sense to say that we’re actually perceiving
atoms, and easily mistake them for a pot. 
For once more, as each the Buddhist reductionist and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika
anti-reductionist agree, we are able to’t understand
atoms in any respect, even in a distorted approach.

The
commentators additionally contemplate the suggestion that the options of a composite can
be accounted for completely by means of components just like the proximity and call
between atoms, and that the “conjunction” of atoms that yields a purported
composite is nothing greater than that. (Cf. pp. 106-7.)  The commentator Vātsyāyana responds that
there needs to be extra to it than this insofar as “new entities” with distinctive
properties can come up out of the conjunction of atoms.  He appears to be presenting a variation on the
theme acquainted from up to date anti-reductionist views (together with
up to date hylemorphism) that wholes have causal powers and properties that
are irreducible to the sum of the powers and properties of the elements.  Certainly, Uddyotakara illustrates this concept by
noting that “yarn is totally different from the material comprised of it, for the reason that two have
totally different causal capacities” (p. 107).

He additionally
argues that yarn should be totally different from the material comprised of it insofar because the
former is a trigger of the latter
(Ibid.).  And he distinguishes this trigger
from the material’s “different causes,” equivalent to “the weaver’s loom.”  Right here we’d appear to have an implicit
distinction between what Aristotelians name materials
trigger (the yarn) and environment friendly trigger
(the weaver’s loom).  However Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika
speaks of a factor’s “inherence trigger” relatively than materials trigger, i.e. that in
which the qualities of the composite inhere.  And the notion of an inherence trigger is
broader than that of fabric trigger, since it might probably embrace issues aside from
matter (e.g. a location). 

Vital
variations apart, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika place, like different anti-reductionist
positions within the historical past of philosophy, converges in key methods with Aristotelian
hylemorphism.  On the very least, it
appears clearly to quantity to a sort of non-reductive physicalism, and maybe
even approximates what’s right this moment typically known as “structural hylemorphism”
(which differs from conventional Aristotelian-Thomistic hylemorphism by taking
elements to exist really relatively than nearly in wholes – thereby, from the A-T
perspective, abandoning the unicity of considerable kind). 

As I argue
in chapter 3 of Scholastic
Metaphysics
, these forms of anti-reductionism are finally
unstable makes an attempt at a center place between reductionism on the one hand and
A-T hylemorphism on the opposite. 
Sustaining a coherent anti-reductionism requires going the entire
Aristotelian hog.

Associated posts:

Nyāya
arguments for a First Trigger

Dharmakīrti
and Maimonides on divine motion

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